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Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation
Carolyn Fischer, William A. PizerAbstract: Choices in energy regulation, particularly whether and how to price exter-
nalities, can have widely different distributional consequences both across and within
income groups. Traditional welfare theory focuses largely on effects across income
groups; such “vertical equity” concerns can typically be addressed by a progressive re-
distribution of emissions revenues. In this paper, we review alternative economic per-
spectives that give rise to equity concerns within income groups, or “horizontal equity,”
and suggest operational measures. We then apply those measures to a stylized model
of pollution regulation in the electricity sector. In addition, we look for ways to present
the information behind those measures directly to stakeholders. We show how hor-
izontal equity concerns might overshadow efficiency concerns in this context.
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ulatory design, favoring Pigouvian pricing mechanisms for addressing environmental
externalities. Implicitly or explicitly, economists’ favoritism assumes that equity con-
cerns can be dealt with by allocating the rents created by emissions pricing. For example,
tax rate changes can redistribute rents to achieve a desired level of progressivity across
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S210 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019In this paper, we make three observations that together suggest that favoritism for
Pigouvian policies may be misplaced because equity concerns are not so easily van-
quished. First, the focus on equity as a question of effects across income groups, and
the poor as a collective group, derives from traditional welfare theory, which places
value on equalizing household utility and bringing the poor and rich closer together.
However, an alternative line of thought, typically referred to as fair burden or horizon-
tal equity (HE), places value on similar households’ facing similar changes. The dis-
tribution of effects across income groups still matters but so do effects within income
groups.
Second, Pigouvian pricing policies can involve household-level costs and benefits
that are orders of magnitude larger than those arising under other, non-Pigouvian pol-
icies. This is true even as positive and negative household-level effects cancel out in the
aggregate and Pigouvian policies are less expensive for society. Finally, the redistribu-
tion created by Pigouvian pricing of energy externalities can be substantially unrelated
to income and other easily observable variables. This makes it difficult if not impos-
sible to neutralize large, unequal effects within income groups.
Taken together, these observations suggest that Pigouvian energy regulation may
have relatively large, unavoidable, horizontal equity effects and that economists’ favor-
itism may be misplaced. It also raises a question: How can policy analysts present in-
formation about horizontal equity in ways that facilitate stakeholder discussion and
policy maker decisions?
We note that this is not always the case. Some Pigouvian energy regulation does
not directly affect households and equity effects are manageable. Under the acid rain
program, for example, sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from coal-fired power plants were
capped at an agreed-upon level.With a general notion of how to allocate emissions rights,
attention then shifted to horse trading among emitting companies to address the exact
distribution of burden (Cohen 1995). But importantly, the price of electricity was largely
unaffected (Burtraw et al. 2005).Natural gas generators are often themarginal producers
and do not emit SO2. Hence, power generation companies were the ones that felt the
effects of the regulation and allocation choices—and were directly involved in those
choices: Coasean bargaining at its best.
Market-based CO2 programs, however, have the potential to raise electricity and
other energy prices significantly. More than a hundred million households, as well
as businesses, will feel the direct effect of regulation as well as the choices about allow-
ance or revenue allocations. Direct horse trading to address equity is difficult if not im-
possible. Individual bargaining is replaced by generic rules, perhaps based on income or
other observable demographics. As we show, it will be difficult to alleviate substantial
inequity from energy price effects based on observable demographics.
Although our contribution ties energy regulation to policy-making concerns about
horizontal equity, we are not the first paper to remark on these additional distribu-
tional effects of Pigouvian energy pricing. Burtraw and Palmer (2008) find that a car-
bon pricing policy has net social costs of roughly $0.5 billion annually, while consum-
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toward fuel taxes, Poterba (1991) presents gasoline expenditures by income decile but
also reports the fraction of each decile where expenditures shares are above 0.1 and
where they are equal to zero. He finds an average share of 0.039 for the lowest decile,
but 36% of this decile spend nothing on gasoline while 14% have an expenditure share
exceeding 0.1. Among practitioners, analysis of tax reform proposals regularly focuses
on the coefficient of variation of effects within income groups (Westort and Wagner
2002).
Taking amore expansive approach, Rausch et al. (2011) use graphical figures to pre-
sent the distributional effects of carbon pricing associated with various rebate ap-
proaches. Their box-and-whisker plots, similar to our preferred graphical figures, show
outcomes across and within income deciles. They highlight that some amount of pro-
gressivity and regressivity is certainly present, with the mean cost by decile ranging from
0% to 0.5% of income. At the same time, a large number of households experience gains
and losses of more than 1%.
In a paper directly related to ours, Cronin et al. (2019, in this issue) consider a car-
bon tax paired with several alternative rebate mechanisms: a per capita rebate, an in-
crease in the EITC, and cuts in payroll taxes coupled with increases in social security
benefits. In their analysis, they pay particular attention to horizontal equity concerns:
they find that the horizontal variation caused by various rebate schemes is larger than
the variation caused by the carbon tax itself. Like Rausch et al., this variation is as large
as, if not larger than, the differences in mean effects across deciles.
Beyond these noted papers, horizontal equity is largely ignored by economists writ-
ing about energy policy. Even those papers that characterize variation in household ef-
fects within income groups do not define an associated welfare cost. And only Burtraw
and Palmer (2008) point out that non-Pigouvian policies can lead to much smaller dis-
tributional effects. In this way, we believe our paper offers a new perspective on efficiency-
equity concerns.
To make our points about horizontal equity and Pigouvian pricing, we first review
the various rationales for valuing horizontal equity as well as the controversies. We
then present two welfare measures to operationalize these ideas and explain how they
relate to models in the literature. To relate this to energy policy, we then turn to how
energy regulation affects energy prices and ultimately household welfare.We consider a
stylized model of two climate change policies. One policy is Pigouvian pricing, a mass-
based cap-and-trade (CAT) policy applied to the electric power sector with auction
revenue used to provide an equal rebate per household. The other is non-Pigouvian,
a rate-based tradable performance standard (TPS) that is effectively a revenue-neutral
combination of a tax on emissions and a subsidy to output of electricity. Thanks to the
subsidy, the TPS does not raise electricity prices as much as the CAT.
To complete the task, we simulate the distributional consequences of these policies
using a sample of observed consumer expenditures. Within this sample we see a large
heterogeneity of household electricity expenditures even within a single income group.
S212 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019The CAT therefore results in much more horizontal, within-income-group redistri-
bution than the TPS.We put these outcomes into our welfare measure and show that
this can translate into lower welfare under CAT versus TPS. Finally, we consider
ways that one might present this information to stakeholders and policy makers with-
out appealing to elaborate welfare theories while still remaining consistent with those
theories. And we revisit the degree to which horizontal equity might be attenuated
using other observable data, arguing that such efforts are unlikely to help.1. FOUNDATIONS OF HORIZONTAL EQUITY
IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Equity and justice have long been principles in public economics (Elkins 2006).Within
this rich intellectual history, we identify two threads that speak to the idea of treating
similar households similarly in public policy. An older literature frames the discussion
in terms of equal sacrifice regarding the provision of public goods, and a more recent,
welfarist approach builds on the axiomatic treatment of welfare measures. The latter
encompasses both provision of public goods and redistribution from rich to poor. Be-
yond public economics, one can interpret the behavioral work by Tversky, Kahneman,
and others as supporting horizontal equity. Here, we review these ideas before turning
to operationalizing our approach.1.1. Equal Sacrifice
The principle of equal sacrifice dates at least to the nineteenth century. For John Stuart
Mill (1871, 155), “Equality of taxation . . . means equality of sacrifice. It means appor-
tioning the contribution of each person toward the expenses of government so that he
shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every
other person experiences from his.”This principle of equal sacrifice in paying for public
goods could be interpreted as supporting progressive taxation, to ensure equal conse-
quences in terms of utility and to ensure that equally situated persons are treated
equally. The nineteenth-century utilitarian philosopher and economist Henry Sidg-
wick (1883) considered equal sacrifice the “obviously equitable principle—assuming
that the existing distribution of wealth is accepted as just or not unjust” (bk. III, chap. 7,
sec. 1, para. 1). In other words, assuming that society does not want to engage in addi-
tional income redistribution, the burdens of financing government should be shared
equally.
The question of whether society does or does not want to engage in income redis-
tribution is an important distinction. This older literature tended to separate this ques-
tion from the question of how to fund public goods. Tracing back to the Greeks, Elkins
(2006, 73) argues that the principal of equal treatment can be seen as an application of
Aristotelian philosophy, in which a just distribution is based on merit. If individuals
“merit” their status quo ante distribution, then they should merit equal shares in the
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S213postintervention distribution. Of course, because the definition of merit matters for
evaluating the fairness of Aristotelian justice, “the moral basis of horizontal equity de-
pends upon the moral standing of the market distribution.”
A second distinction framed in the early literature is the fair treatment of similar
individuals versus the fair treatment of very different individuals. In a treatise on tax
policy, Simons (1938, 106) states that “taxes should bear similarly upon persons sim-
ilarly situated.” Pigou himself noted that “equal sacrifice among similar and similarly
situated persons is an entirely different thing from equal sacrifice among all persons”
(Pigou 1928, pt. II, chap. 1, sec. 7).
1.2. Welfarism
The distinction between vertical and horizontal equity came to prominence in the early
and mid-twentieth century, but it was the welfarists in the latter part of the twentieth
century who introduced these terms. In that context, mitigating social inequality be-
came referred to as “vertical equity” and treating people in similar circumstances sim-
ilarly became recognized as “horizontal equity” (Elkins 2006, 43). Now, in addition to
questions about taxes and the provision of public goods, social policy explicitly consid-
ered redistribution.
Welfarism looks at the desirability of public policy in terms of whether the state of
affairs with the policy has a higher welfare measure than the state without (Sen 1979).
A distinctive feature of horizontal equity is the comparison with a reference point, rooted
in the status quo ante. Whereas vertical equity can be measured for any distribution of
income or utility (such as with a Gini coefficient, before or after a policy intervention),
assessing horizontal equity requires a change to evaluate. Similarly situated persons are
so situated ex ante, and that reference point sits within a preexisting vertical distribution.
Most traditional, axiomatic welfare measures (see chap. 23 of Mueller 2003) avoid ref-
erence points and fail to capture horizontal equity. Moreover, it is inclusion of a refer-
ence point that has regularly led to controversy.
Different approaches have been taken with respect to reference points. Early eco-
nomic applications of horizontal equity in public finance focused on rank as a reference
point. The Pigou-Dalton axiom holds that a social welfare function should prefer al-
locations that are more (vertically) equitable, as long as redistribution does not change
the ranking of individuals. Adler (2013, 1) defends this “prioritarian” view, adjusting
the measure of well-being according to responsibility: “if one person is at a higher level
of well-being than a second, and the worse-off one is not responsible for being worse
off, then distributive justice recommends a non-leaky, non-rank-switching transfer of
well-being from the first to the second, if no one else’s well-being changes.”
A later application by Auerbach and Hassett (2002) introduces reference points by
nesting groups with similar prepolicy incomes into an aggregate welfare function. Sepa-
rate elasticity parameters penalize income inequality within the nested groups (horizontal
equity) and across nested groups (vertical equity). Otherwise, the aggregate function
S214 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019looks like a more traditional welfare function of postpolicy outcomes, not changes. In
practice, this makes it difficult to measure horizontal equity effects arising from a new
policy when changes in income are small relative to existing differences between indi-
viduals within each nested group.1 This is often the case with energy regulation.
In a series of articles, Kaplow (1989, 1992, 2000) critiques both applications and the
underlying principles of horizontal equity. He is particularly critical of operationalizing
the early focus on rank, where large rank-preserving redistributions would have to be
compared with infinitesimal rank-inverting redistributions. The implied idea of large dis-
continuities in a welfare measure is unappealing. But he is more generally critical of the
notion of a valid reference point, which he considers counter to the idea of economic mo-
bility. He suggests that the status quo as a reference point arbitrarily treats policy out-
comes as more significant than the “luck” leading to status quo differences. Moreover,
once a policy is implemented, it becomes the status quo. If a policy has negative HE con-
sequences, so does reversing the policy. He points out that HE implies a trade-off with
the Pareto principle. Even if no one is worse off, there may be unequal treatment of sim-
ilar households (though we show that this need not alter Pareto welfare rankings). Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this paper to respond to all of Kaplow’s criticisms—crit-
icisms that we view as pointing out logistical consequences but not being fatal to the idea
of HE in any case—there is certainly evidence that people think in terms of reference
points.
1.3. Behavioral Economics
Distinct from the philosophical origins of horizontal equity, behavioral economics pro-
vides another motivation for believing reference points are important. In particular,
theoretical foundations for reference-based utility were offered by psychologists Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979), who propose prospect theory as a way to incorporate observed
behavioral biases in decision making. Central concepts are that people evaluate outcomes
relative to a reference point, and gains are evaluated differently from losses, expressed by
“loss aversion.”Kahneman andTversky were not explicit about the origin of the reference
point, but proposed candidates have included the expected outcome (Kőszegi and Rabin
2006, 2007, 2009), the status quo (the “endowment effect” in Thaler 1980), or the av-
erage outcome of others. Although prospect theory was postulated for decision making
under uncertainty (and also includes concepts related to biases in evaluating high-risk,
low-probability events), Michaelson (2015, 202) argues that the same biases also hold
for resource distribution problems in the aggregate. His findings “suggest that neither
utilitarian nor Rawlsian objectives will properly describe whatmost people believe is fair.”1. Auerbach and Hassett remark that the horizontal equity effects of income taxes are equiv-
alent to an across-the-board 0.2% to 0.4% tax increase—roughly a fraction 1/100 of total tax
costs.
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equity in policy making.1.4. Applications to Energy and Environmental Policy
There is reason to believe that horizontal equity issues can loom much larger than ver-
tical equity ones for environmental policy. First, broad-based tax policy is the govern-
ment’s primary tool for addressing vertical inequality; environmental policy is an indi-
rect one at best. If one believes that the overall tax system has evolved to address social
inequality to the extent that the existing distribution is “just,” then a reasonable equity
principle for allocating the burden of environmental policy is to avoid distortions to that
distribution. That is, the goal is equal sacrifice relative to the status quo. Second, en-
vironmental policy costs tend to be small compared with income and other taxes but
highly heterogeneous. In the application we consider, the effects are on the order of tens
or hundreds of dollars per household.2 Such changes are unlikely to affect vertical eq-
uity in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, equity and fairness concerns remain in the same
way that overall cost-benefit concerns remain. And although most households have op-
tions to change behavior and reduce their energy consumption, some margins may be
constrained by housing type, climate conditions, family size, landlord-tenant relation-
ships, and other factors. These constraints may need to be taken into account in assess-
ing equity concerns (e.g., “responsibility” and “merit” in the prioritarian and Aristote-
lian senses).
In the next section, we propose a framework for considering horizontal equity ef-
fects in assessing the costs of a policy and explain its roots. We then show how this
relates to the welfare function in Slesnick (1989), which uses changes in utility relative
to a reference point, as well as an aggregate welfare function based on the value func-
tions put forward by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).2. OPERATIONALIZING HORIZONTAL EQUITY
IN WELFARE THEORY
As previously discussed, operationalizing horizontal equity into a welfare function faces
the challenge of incorporating the referential nature of equal sacrifice while retaining
sensible notions regarding redistribution. In this section, we draw on work by Slesnick
(1989) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to motivate a particular welfare measure
that includes horizontal and vertical equity. To make concepts clear, we specify an ini-
tial distribution of incomes, {y0i }, for a group of N households. These households are
affected by a policy that leads to a distribution of changes (consumption variation) given2. In contrast, the threshold for “significant regulatory action” requiring cost-benefit analysis
is $100 million, or just $1 per household (US Government, Executive order 12866, Regulatory
planning and review (1993)).
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change in net income:3
W0 5 Dy – gN
–1o
i
Dyi – rij j (1)
as well as a slight variant:





Dyi – rið Þ2
s
: (2)
In both cases, W is scaled to household, monetary terms in the ballpark of the av-
erage household net income change, Dy 5 N–1oiDyi. Here, ri is a reference point for
household i, where ri is constructed such that N–1oiri 5 Dy. The measure W0 de-
pends on the average absolute deviations from ri, and W1 depends on the squared
(weighted) deviations from ri. The parameter g is a weight (1 ≥ g ≥ 0) placed on
the second term. We will go through the origins of these welfare functions momen-
tarily—importantly, what might generate ri—but for a moment we highlight a few
features.
First, we refer to the second term, after g, as an “equity penalty” arising from de-
viations from fair burden (when we want to refer to the term including g, we will refer
to the “weighted equity penalty”). The first term (Dy) measures nonequity costs or
benefits and simply depends on average (or, multiplied by N, total) costs or benefits.
This term is unaffected by how those costs or benefits are distributed. The second
term measures the effect of deviations from a particular distribution of burden given
by the ri’s. These ri’s are able to capture the idea of vertical equity or fairness—the
burden that households in different situations should bear to achieve the fairest pos-
sible outcome. To the extent actual household costs match those defined by the ri, the
penalty is zero. To the extent household costs differ from r, in either vertical (across
initially different households) or horizontal (among initially similar households) ways,
the penalty is positive and subtracts from welfare.43. The purpose of the measures is to facilitate an evaluation of net benefits from a single
policy or a choice among policies. We intentionally refer to W as a “welfare measure for a spe-
cific, policy-induced change” without suggesting that the measure should be treated as changes
in some welfare level that cumulates policy after policy. For example, we do not refer to our
expressions as DW.
4. It is worth noting that this welfare measure is subject to the Kaplow criticism that enact-
ing a policy and then removing it can both involve adverse equity penalties. Imagine a policy that
matches fair burden but then adds some random transfers among similarly situated individuals.
The adverse equity penalty that would arise from both implementing and reversing the policy
could be viewed as friction.
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the importance of equity concerns and is unavoidable to fully operationalize the wel-
fare metric. As we discuss below, it is natural to constrain g. In particular, it might not
be so large that making a single person better off, without harming any other, lowers
welfare, at least from the status quo, leading to our constraint that g ≤ 1. That ad-
dresses one of Kaplow’s criticisms, noted above, that HE alone implies a violation
of the Pareto principle.
Third, and perhaps most usefully, notions of horizontal and vertical equity can be
decomposed. For example, suppose we define the reference point ri to be the average
burden in one’s own decile Dyd(i) where d(i) maps individuals into deciles. (We do this
formally in our modeling application section.) The penalty now approximates HE only.
That is, the deciles as a whole are not penalized for whatever burden they bear, on av-
erage. The only penalty is for variation within the decile—whether similar individuals
are treated similarly or not.5 The additional penalty associated with alternative defini-
tions of ri comes from vertical inequity.
The fourth and last feature, which we demonstrate in our application, is that our
measures allow quick and easy calculation of this HE component of the penalty term
based on decile summary statistics. We can construct the HE penalty inW0 from the
average absolute deviation of burden by decile. And the HE penalty inW1 is approx-
imated based on the standard deviation of burden by decile. That is, if we compute the
average absolute deviation of Dyi and the standard deviation of Dyi for each decile, the
HE penalties in W0 and W1 are the simple and (approximately) weighted quadratic
average across deciles, respectively, of these two statistics. These penalty functions are









where u is a utility function and r ≥ 0 is an inequality aversion parameter, which we
discuss below.
We now turn to the literature to understand the underlying justification for (1)
and (2).
2.1. Slesnick
Slesnick (1989) provides the main motivation for our welfare measure. He uses a wel-
fare function based on deviations in household utility u from an initial reference point.
Here, we have simplified his model to match our notation, making utility u solely a5. We could instead imagine a more complicated scheme that would define ri in terms of a
more localized mean of the Dyi’s, rather than grouping households into deciles. This would be a
more precise HE-only measure.
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Dui 5 u(y0i 1 Dyi) – u(y
0
i ).
The welfare function begins with a weighted average of utility changes across house-
holds, from which is subtracted a measure of deviations from this average. In this way,
variation across households in their utility change is costly in terms of welfare, and the
welfare-maximizing policy would generally involve an equal utility change across all
households. This is the equal sacrifice notion. Slesnick’s welfare function can be written
as
Ws 5 Du – g oai Dui – Du
 11r  111r, (3)
where Du 5 oiaiDui and oiai 5 1.
We can already see that (3) is somewhat similar to (1) and (2) in functional form,
with one term capturing the average utility effect and the second a penalty for unequal
distribution. That is, the welfare function is increasing in the average utility change but
decreasing in a measure of deviations of changes in individual utility from the average.
This equity penalty includes horizontal inequity, when individuals with similar in-
comes face different utility changes. But it also includes vertical inequity, when, col-
lectively, those individuals at a given income level deviate from the income change im-
plied by Du at that income level.
Without defining the weights in (3), rearranging burdens to minimize deviations in
utility changes may affect average utility. However, by weighting the individual devi-
ations by the inverse of marginal utility, we can completely disentangle total burdens






When these weights are used—and assuming income changes are small relative to
total income, so Dui 5 u0(y0i )Dyi—the average utility change reduces to a rescaled av-
erage income change:
Du 5 oaiDui 5 oi
u0 y0ið Þ–1Dui
oiu0 y0i
 	–1 5 oiu0 y0ið Þ–1u0 y0ið ÞDyioiu0 y0i 	–1 5 u
0 × Dy,6. Negishi (1960) formalized an insight for evaluating policies that do not have a primary
goal of manipulating the distribution of income. It involved weighting individual utilities by
the inverse of the marginal utility of income. With this weighting, the summed social welfare
function replicates the market distribution, and marginal movements of income among individ-
uals do not affect welfare.
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S219where, as before, Dy 5 N–1oDyi is the simple average change in income and u0 5
(N–1oiu0(y0i )
–1)–1 is the harmonic average of individual marginal utility. In this
way, we see that the first term in (3), Du, depends only on the average income change,
not on how the income changes are allocated. That is, we can reallocate dollar costs
across households without affecting the first term (or the basis of fair burden in the
second term). The penalty is then minimized and welfare maximized with a burden
reallocation such that Du(y0i ) 5 Du for all households. In terms of income, this im-
plies a specific notion of fair burden given by







 	 5 u0Dy
u0 y0i
 	 : (4)
As shown in the appendix, we can use these values of ai in (3) and ri in (4) to pro-
duce u0W0 and u0W1 in (1) and (2) through a bit of manipulation and parameter as-
sumptions. Hence, Slesnick provides one basis for choosing our welfare measures.
How does this expression for fair burden, (u0/u0i)Dy, in (4) vary across households
with different incomes? That depends on the shape of the utility function. Suppose we
assume iso-elastic utility, where
ui 5 u yið Þ 5 1 – tð Þ–1y1–ti , (5)
so u0(yi) 5 yi–t. Consider two households, rich (R) and poor (P), where y0R > y
0
P.











When t 5 1 (i.e., log utility), the welfare-maximizing burden allocation is an equal
percentage of income for all households. When t > 1, the rich household should
pay a higher disproportionate share of income than the poor household. That is,
r(y0R)/r(y
0
P) > yR/yP. When t < 1, the rich household still pays more in absolute
terms but less than a proportionate share of income relative to the poorest.
The Negishi weights have another important and related consequence for the
Slesnick welfare function. Imagine that we are examining an outcome where
0 > Dui(yi) – Du > Duj(yj) – Du. Both households are faring worse than the average
burden,Du. But household j is bearing a more extreme adverse burden. Consider a small
transfer of income to household i from j. Along the lines of the Pigou-Dalton principle,
we would want this transfer to improve welfare, since it would reduce the more extreme
deviation from the average utility change without affecting individuals other than i and j.
Based on theNegishi weights, this will be true so long as r > 0. That is, the derivative of
the second term in (2) for a reallocation dy from i to j would be
1 1 rð Þ aj Duj – Du
 ru0 y0j 	 – ai Dui – Du ru0 y0i 	 	dy 
5
1 1 rð Þ
oiu0 y0i
 	–1 Duj – Du r – Dui – Du r 	dy,
S220 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019which is positive so long as r > 0, given the larger deviation in utility for household j. If
r 5 0, Pigou-Dalton holds only weakly. Welfare is not improved by such transfers but
neither is it reduced. In that case, we do not care about more extreme burdens.
This point highlights the importance of r in the Slesnick function. The form
(oiaijDui – Duj11r)1/(11r) is an example of a power mean. This simplifies to an arith-
metic mean of when r 5 0 and standard deviation when r 5 1, our two formulations
of interest. More generally, the expression converges to the maximum value of
FDui – DuF as r→∞ (see Bullen 2003, chap. 3). In other words, r governs the degree
of aversion to extremes of inequality in the Pigou-Dalton sense, versus a general aver-
sion to differences, however small or large. Larger values of r will imply more concerns
about extreme deviations, while r 5 0 cares only about the average deviation.
The only remaining parameter is g. A value of g ≥ 0 simply reflects the relative im-
portance of equity, measured by the second term, and overall cost, measured by the
first. If g is zero, there is no concern for the distribution of costs. For large values of
g, we are increasingly willing to accept a higher overall cost to society to achieve a more
equitable burden. Slesnick picks g to be as large as possible while still satisfying the cri-
terion that a Pareto-improving policy raises welfare regardless of the distribution. As
we show in the appendix, this amounts to g 5 1 forW0. We require g ≤ 1 to be con-
sistent with the Pareto criterion but are otherwise agnostic.
2.2. Prospect Theory
The welfare measure W0 in (1) can also be motivated by prospect theory. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) argue that gains or losses are evaluated relative to a reference point
and welfare exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. Consistent with prospect
theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offer a value function for a gain or loss x with
the power function form v(x) 5 xa for x ≥ 0, and v(x) 5 –(1 1 λ)(–x)β for x < 0,
where a > 0, β > 0, and λ > 0 implies loss aversion.7
Let us create an aggregate welfare function WPT reflecting the principles of pros-
pect theory, with underlying assumptions analogous to those in WS. Assume that
a ≈ β ≈ 1.8 Furthermore, the gain or loss is assessed relative to an individual refer-
ence point, ri, so x in the value function is given by x 5 Dyi – ri where Dyi is again
the income change for household i. We write an aggregate welfare function, including
individual reference points and loss aversion:7. al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) show that preference homogeneity in the presence of loss aver-
sion then requires a 5 β. Diminishing sensitivity would require a ∈ (0, 1), implying risk aver-
sion over gains and risk seeking over losses.
8. This assumption implies that marginal utility is locally flat, allowing for straightforward
aggregation.
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where we have ordered individuals from greatest loss to greatest gain, i* is the last in-
dividual suffering a loss (e.g., Dyi < ri for i ≤ i＊ and Dyi ≥ ri for i > i＊), and λ > 0 for
loss aversion. In order to simplify to the second line of (6), suppose the reference point
is some notion of a fair allocation of burden for a particular aggregate burden, ∑Dyi, so
ori 5 oDyi as before. With that assumption, the sum of the absolute value of losses
equals the sum of the absolute value of gains: that is, oi
＊
i51(ri – Dyi) 5 oNi5i＊11(Dyi –
ri). We can further rewrite expression (6) to show that a mean-preserving increase in
the absolute deviations of outcomes reduces welfare:
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Replacing g 5 λ/2, this is the same expression asW0 in (1). Prospect theory leads to
a more generic notion of fair burden, ri, which is otherwise determined by equal utility
change in the Slesnick formulation. On the other hand, the Slesnick framework allows
the incorporation of a more general notion of inequality aversion (r) that is sensitive to
more extreme deviations from the welfare-maximizing burden. This motivates the al-
ternative W1 in (2).
2.3. Discussion
Ultimately, using either the Slesnick or prospect theory approach requires assigning
values to what are at best subjective parameters of the social welfare function. These
subjective parameters include the degree of inequality aversion g in (3) or loss aversion
λ in (6), the notion of utility curvature t in (5) or fair burden ri in (6), and the aversion
to extreme inequality r in (3).
One approach is to assume values for some parameters in order to provide relatively
simple expressions, as we have done for r in (1) and (2) and partly for t in (2). For
others, such as fair burden ri and inequality aversion g, we leave them unspecified
for the moment. We then return to discuss these parameters as we present numerical
welfare results and compare policies.
S222 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019A somewhat different approach is to recognize that the distribution of Dyi by decile
(both within and across) approximates what matters for welfare. We can then present
this information graphically and use summary statistics for various policy alternatives.
The end users apply their own judgment and values to draw conclusions, rather than
trying to choose parameters.
We now turn to a policy application to highlight these approaches.
3. MODELING HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES UNDER DIFFERENT
ELECTRICITY SECTOR POLICIES
We wish to make concrete our observations about horizontal equity as applied to en-
ergy regulation. To that end, we consider a stylized example of alternative policies de-
signed to achieve the same carbon emissions outcome in the electric power sector: cap
and trade (CAT) and tradable performance standards (TPS). This choice of policies
is a particularly relevant question for stakeholders. Both types of policies have been
proposed for the electric power sector over the past decade (Waxman 2009; Bingaman
2012). The Clean Power Plan also provided states with options for both rate-based
(i.e., TPS) and mass-based trading (i.e., CAT). China is currently implementing a
tradable performance standard in the power sector, even as other countries have em-
braced cap and trade (Pizer and Zhang 2018).
To construct our example, we first present a simple analytic model to highlight dif-
ferent household outcomes under the two policies and to relate those outcomes to a
small number of parameters. We then use data from the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey and other sources to quantify the household outcomes. Subsequently, we show how
these effects look when viewed through the lens of the welfare functions developed in
the previous section.
3.1. Simple Electricity Sector Model
Our economic framework for comparing policies is a partial equilibrium model of the
power sector. On the demand side, we focus on the case of perfectly inelastic electricity
demand by each household. It may seem strange to abstract from the notion of demand
response, which eliminates any aggregate cost advantage of CAT (the Pigouvian policy)
over TPS in our simple model. That is, the underlying point of the paper is that there is
an equity-efficiency trade-off, and here we assume that there is no efficiency advantage
of CAT.
However, a necessary condition for an equity-efficiency trade-off is that equity effects
are large enough that TPS could be preferred. By focusing on the case of inelastic de-
mand, we focus on just how large the equity concern might be. Most importantly, fixing
electricity demand simplifies our exposition. Each household’s loss of real income equals
its individual increase in electricity costs minus its share of any allowance value rebated
directly to households.
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S223On the supply side, we assume constant-returns-to-scale technology with the unit
cost determined by the carbon price. This allows us to capture the key features that
concern us. On the one hand, we want to see an increase in the cost of electricity as-
sociated with a carbon price under either TPS or CAT. On the other hand, we want
to capture different electricity price effects when the associated allowance value is ei-
ther rebated in the electricity price under TPS or assigned to households under CAT.
These are the salient features of the more complex models we aspire to emulate, such
as Burtraw and Palmer (2008).
Formally, let pz be the electricity price, and pm be the allowance price. Let C0 be unit
production costs in the absence of regulation. Market-based regulation adds two com-
ponents: unit abatement costs (UAC) and unit emissions payments (UEP). If TAC is
total abatement costs, then UAC 5 TAC/Z, where Z is the (fixed) aggregate gener-
ation. Assuming cost minimization over a constant-returns-to-scale technology, mar-
ginal abatement costs (MAC) are equal to the price (∂TAC/∂M 5 pm). That is,
we treat pollution like any other input that has to be purchased at price pm, and we
assume other input prices are fixed.
Total emissions payments areTEP 5 pmM, whereM is total emissions after respond-
ing to the regulation. Similar to converting TAC to UAC, unit emissions payments are
defined asUEP 5 TEP/Z 5 pm(M/Z). That is,UEP equal the emissions price multi-
plied by the average emissions intensity per unit of generation. Since even freely allocated
allowances have an opportunity cost, this component of the unit cost increase occurs re-
gardless of how permits are allocated, and whether they arise under TPS or CAT. We
refer to the emissions payments interchangeably as emissions rents or allowance value.
We see these cost components in figure 1, where M0 is the emissions level when
pm 5 0. As the electricity sector begins to pay a positive price pm > 0 for its emissions,
M, producers will begin to reduce emissions by M0 – M. This incurs an abatement
cost, the area under the MAC schedule, highlighted by region TAC in the figure.
Electricity producers also face a cost pm for emissions that occur,M, highlighted by
region TEP. We have drawn the figure for total generation, so we must scale the in-
crease in total production costs by 1/Z, the fixed total electricity demand, to relate the
TEP to the change in unit costs of electricity production.
Notably, for all but very deep reduction targets, the size of the emissions rents is
much larger than the total abatement costs (TEP ≫ TAC). Thus, market-based pol-
icies create the potential for large redistributions, based on the allocation of these rents.
With CAT, the increase in electricity prices due to the regulation equals the sum of
the UAC and UEC:
DpCATz 5 UAC 1 UEP,
where the superscript CAT reflects the outcome under cap and trade. Allowance val-
ues are allocated in lump-sum fashion, so their distribution does not affect behavior or
S224 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019electricity prices. Let us assume that the total allowance value TEP is rebated to each
household i based on an assigned share si. That is, each household receives siTEP.
A TPS sets a performance rate R (expressed in pollution/unit of electricity). Each
unit of generation is allocated allowances equal to this benchmark, R, and through
trading an equilibrium is reached where the overall average emissions intensity equals
the performance rate, orM/Z 5 R. Fixing total emissions to be the same under both
policies, emissions prices and total emissions payments are as before (pm and TEP).
However, under TPS this allowance value is rebated as a subsidy to electricity produc-
tion. At the unit level, this subsidy equals pmM/Z 5 pmR 5 UEP. This subsidy is
passed on to consumers and serves to mitigate the electricity price increase:
DpTPSz 5 UAC 1 UEP – pmR
5 UAC:
Here, the superscript TPS reflects the outcome under the tradable performance stan-
dard. That is, the unit cost increase is driven only by the abatement cost, not the al-
lowance rent.
With this supply model, we can now turn to household outcomes. With house-
holds i ∈ f1, ::: ,Ng, let Zi represent household i’s fixed electricity consumption such
that Z 5 oiZi. As noted above, fixing this consumption implies that a household’s
loss of real income equals the increased cost of electricity minus any share of the
allowance allocation. Under TPS this is given by DyTPSi 5 –UAC  Zi. Under a
CAT, the real income change is given by DyCATi 5 –(UAC 1 UEP)Zi 1 si  TEP;Figure 1. Comparing emissions rents, TEP, with compliance costs, TAC
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S225that is, the added cost of buying the fixed electricity demand Zi subtracted from the
household’s share of allowance value.
The difference between the policy outcomes for household i thus depends on whether
the value of the household’s share of the allowance revenues exceeds its share of electricity
consumption: DyCATi – Dy
TPS
i 5 (si  TEP – Zi  UEP) 5 (si – Zi/Z)TEP. On net,
both shares sum to one, so oi(si – Zi/Z) 5 0 and aggregate costs for both polices are
given by NDy 5 oiDyi 5 –TAC.
At this point, for expositional purposes, we fix si 5 1/N; that is, equal rebates per
household. This cap-and-dividend approach is consistently suggested in various carbon
pricing schemes (Inglis 2009; Larson 2015; Baker et al. 2017; Blumenauer 2017).
Nonetheless, we return to this assumption at the very end of our analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the household outcomes for each policy and how they relate to
summary cost parameters and data, with Z 5 Z/N as mean electricity consumption.
Based on our model and assumptions, the TPS distributes the abatement costs accord-
ing to electricity consumption shares, and the CAT policy adds a net emissions rent
that is positive for households with below-average electricity consumption. These are
the major differences that we want to capture. We now turn to the data that will allow
us to quantify our earlier analytic results. In particular, we need to approximate the dis-
tribution of Zi/Z, which equals the household share of total electricity expenditures in
the population, and to choose the cost parameters TAC and TEP.3.2. Household Data and Mitigation Cost
To provide a basis for likely variation in consumption of electricity and other demo-
graphics necessary for the calculations in table 1 and further discussion, we use US
consumer expenditure data. In particular, we turn to the 2014 Consumer Expenditure
Survey, or CEX (BLS 2014). This is a rolling, quarterly survey: a representative sam-
ple of US households enters each quarter and remains in the survey for five quarters.
We compute the total expenditure on electricity and total expenditures overall for the
calendar year. We include only survey respondents who participated for the entireTable 1. Hypothetical Policies for Numerical Analysis
Effect on Household i
Tradable performance standard (TPS) DyTPSi 5 –(TAC/N)(Zi/Z)
Cap and trade (CAT)
with per household rebate DyCATi 5 –(TAC/N)(Zi/Z) 1 (TEP/N)(1 – Zi/Z)
Difference (CAT minus TPS) DyCATi – Dy
TPS
i 5 (TEP/N)(1 – Zi/Z)Note. TAC is total abatement cost, TEP is total emissions payment, Zi is household i’s electricity ex-
penditure, Z is average electricity expenditure, and N is the total number of households.
S226 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019year (1,086). That is, we first match household respondents on their household iden-
tifier for each quarter of 2014 and keep only those households observed for all four
quarters. We sum reported expenditures on electricity over these four quarters, as well
as total expenditures.9 Table 2 summarizes the data. We also indicate the notation we
have been using that corresponds to each viable.
From table 1, we also need to specify the mitigation costs and rents,TAC andTEP.
Based on recent analysis (EIA 2009), a reasonable assumption is that cap-and-trade
regulation of carbon dioxide might raise electricity prices on the order of 10%. Based
on other analysis (Burtraw and Palmer 2008), a reasonable assumption is that the ac-
tual cost (without the allowance revenue) is perhaps 10% of that (i.e., a 1% increase in
electricity prices). Thus we choose TAC 5 0:01 times the electricity expenditure in
the sample and TEP 5 0:09 times total electricity expenditure. Given the summary
statistics, where the mean electricity expenditure (C0Z) was roughly $1,000 per house-
hold, we have TAC/N 5 $10 and TEP/N 5 $93. With these data and parameters
in hand, we now turn to our results.4. POLICY COMPARISON AND WELFARE MEASURES
We plug the CEX data on Zi and parameters TAC/N and TEP/N, all just discussed,
into the expressions in table 1 for income effects by household. This yields distribu-
tions for DyCATi and Dy
TPS
i across households. Figure 2 presents these distributions
graphically by decile using box-and-whisker plots where CAT is dark gray and TPS
is light gray and deciles are arranged from poorest decile at the bottom to richest at
the top. Two observations stand out. First, although the TPS outcomes are all negative
(consistent with table 1), the CAT outcomes tend to be positive for poorer households.
Because poorer households have smaller electricity expenditures, the per capita rebate
under CAT leads to these positive welfare effects for the majority of households in
the lower half of the income distribution. Second, the range of outcomes is much largerTable 2. Summary Statistics for Numerical Exercise
Observations Mean SD Min Max
Electricity ($, C0Zi) 1,086 1,037 844 0 5,907
Log(electricity) 1,036 6.72 .764 3.64 8.68
Expenditures ($, y0i ) 1,086 35,936 32,518 1,902 330,237
Log(expenditures) 1,086 10.2 .821 7.55 12.71
Electricity share (%, C0Zi/y0i ) 1,086 3.97 3.59 0 28.19. Total expenditures (TOTE
vices as well as contributions to pXPPQ) include a
ensions.ll outlays by households for goods and ser-
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S227within each decile under CAT than under TPS. For example, some households in even
the poorest decile see negative effects under CAT. Among the poorest four deciles,
roughly one-quarter remain worse off.
Note that most alternatives to a per capita rebate would vary the rebate by income.
Such policies would shift the box plots for each expenditure decile but not change the
spread within the decile (because the spread is unrelated to income). Later, we return
to the idea of alternative ways to define the rebate, but arguably none of these alter-
natives would fundamentally change the distinction that CAT creates more within-
decile variability than TPS.
This observation reflects one of the salient practical points of this paper. Although
CAT policies can generally achieve any desired cost distribution across income groups,
including positive outcomes, on average for the poorest, they cannot avoid significant
variation. The range of outcomes is inherently much larger under CAT than under
TPS because the rents TEP tend to be much larger than the mitigation costs TAC,
and because there is significant within-income-group variation in household electricity
use. Once rents enter electricity prices, this large, within-income-group variation will be
difficult to ameliorate.Figure 2. Comparison of cap and trade (CAT) and tradable performance standard (TPS), in
dollars. Note: See table 1. TAC/N 5 $10, TEP/N 5 $93, and the distribution of Zi/Z is as
described in table 2. Boxes indicate interquartile range (IQR, 25th to 75th percentile). Vertical
lines in the middle of the boxes indicate median. Horizontal lines, or whiskers, show the range
of values outside the IQR, up to 1.5× the IQR. Dots indicate each individual value beyond the
whiskers. For normally distributed data, such dots should have a frequency of ∼1%.
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How might this variability translate into welfare considerations? We now turn to our
operational welfare measures, focusing mainly on the equity penalty term (recalling
that the first welfare term equals TAC/N 5 –$10 for both policies). The equity pen-
alty arises from the failure of the actual distribution of household burden Δyi to match
the notion of fair burden ri.
Based on the welfaremeasures in (1) and (2), we first calculate a “total equity penalty.”
We focus on Slesnick’s definition (4) of fair burden ri 5 (u
0/u0i)Dy. Using u0(yi) 5 y–ti
as in (5) leads to ri 5 (y0i /y)
tDy. As noted above, fair burden will rise as a share of in-
come at higher income levels when t > 1 (and the reverse when t < 1).
We noted that one of the useful features of our welfare definitions (1) and (2) is
that they allow a decomposition into horizontal and vertical equity effects. In addition
to the total equity penalty, we also compute the “HE penalty” that arises when we sub-
stitute a reference point equal to the average burden in each household’s income decile
ri 5 Dyd(i), where d(i) identifies that decile (e.g., d maps individuals {1, . . . , N} into
deciles {1, . . . ,10}).
Figure 3 graphs how the equity penalty varies with fair burden as defined by t. The
solid lines in the figure show the total equity penalty and dashed lines show the HE
penalty. Values of both penalties appear along the vertical axis for CAT (black) and
TPS (gray) policies, with values of t indicated along the horizontal axis. The left panel
shows W0 and the right panel W1. Note that the HE penalty does not vary with t,
having replaced the expression of ri that depends on t.Figure 3. Effect of varying power utility parameter t on equity penalty. Note: For the solid
line (total equity penalty), ri 5 (y0i /y)
tDy. That is, fair burden is determined by equal changes
in iso-elastic utility. For the dashed line (horizontal equity), ri 5 Dyd(i).
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S229We make three observations. First, the penalties are uniformly larger forW1 (right
panel) than W0 (left panel). As noted earlier, these two welfare measures can be de-
rived as specific cases (r 5 0 and r 5 1) of the Slesnick welfare function (3). The
parameter r determines the extent to which the penalty tends to the average absolute
deviation versus the more extreme absolute deviations, with higher values of r putting
more weight on more extreme values. Thus, it should not be surprising that, by assum-
ing a larger r, W1 yields larger equity penalties.
Second, the total equity penalty varies with t, reaching a minimum in both the left
and right panels at t ∼ 0:5 for the TPS and t ∼ 2 for the CAT. This reflects the
idea that there is a value of t where the fair burden over initial income levels, deter-
mined by t, most closely matches each policy’s actual distribution of average outcomes.
At that value of t, the penalty is minimized.
Finally, the CAT penalty is much higher than the TPS penalty. The welfare dif-
ference, ∼$50 per household for W0 and ∼$80 for W1, is large compared with the
average cost (ignoring equity) of $10 given byTAC/N. This difference is clearly driven
by the HE component, as the dashed lines account for most of the difference between
CAT and TPS.
This is the other major practical point of this paper. The variation of policy effects
within income groups can be large under Pigouvian pricing. That variation translates
into larger, negative horizontal equity consequences for Pigouvian versus non-Pigouvian
policies. Depending on the weight given to these effects—e.g., the parameter g in (1) and
(2)—it appears large enough to overwhelm some differences in efficiency (e.g., differences
in Dy).
Despite its usefulness, missing from figure 3 is an understanding of how different
deciles contribute to the equity penalty. Is the penalty, particularly the horizontal
component, more sensitive to variation in the rich or poor? We answer that question
in table 3. We present the same information as in figure 3 broken down by decile, for a
single value of t 5 1 (log utility). That is, eight columns (5–8 and 11–14) in table 3
take the values reported by the eight lines in figure 3 for t 5 1, reproduce them in the
last row, and then break them down by income decile in the remainder of the table.
The breakdown by deciles shows that poorer deciles contribute more to the equity
penalty underW1 than underW0. Looking at either policy, and either the total equity
or HE penalty, we see that the penalties uniformly decline moving fromW0 toW1 for
the richest decile but increase for the poorest. For example, horizontal equity for CAT
declines from $83 to $59 for the richest decile and increases from $27 to $84 for the
poorest. This may seem counterintuitive. The range of dollar values is actually largest
for the richest decile in figure 2. Indeed, looking at the standard deviation of burden by
decile, reported in columns 4 and 10, we see the largest values for the richest deciles.
As discussed previously, the equity penalty in W1 is generally larger than the penalty

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S231The explanation lies in the weight (y/y0i ) appearing in (2). In our derivation of (2)
from the Slesnick welfare function, we embed an assumption of log utility with our
assumption of r 5 1 (see appendix). This implies a concern about variation in changes
as a share of incomes. This leads us to down-weight rich households (where shares have
a larger denominator) and up-weight poorer ones (where shares have a smaller denom-
inator) based on y/y0i . Usefully, the difference between the standard deviation by decile
reported in columns 4 and 10 versus the exact HE calculation in columns 9 and 14 is
largely a factor of (y/yd(i)).
4.2. A More General Approach to Horizontal Equity
We have discussed our results in terms of the welfare measures W0 and W1. How-
ever, stakeholders may understandably be hesitant to embrace the ethical judgments of
economists embedded inW0 andW1. This includes the choice of r in (3) and t in (5),
as well as the general “black box” nature of the calculations.
Conveniently, all the information necessary to make welfare judgments is contained
in figure 2 and columns 3–4, 6, 9–10, and 12 in table 3, which provide information
about outcomes by decile, including the central tendency and measures of spread, for
each policy. Stakeholders can decide for themselves how much to weight deviations
within deciles (horizontal equity) as well as how to value the central tendency of each
decile (vertical equity) versus some objective. They need not buy into our particular
assumptions embedded inW0 andW1. At the same time, the information is arguably
consistent with the use of a welfare approach.
We view this approach as similar to the use of Lorenz curves. Lorenz curves rep-
resent a simple summary of income inequality relevant for applying a particular welfare
measure. However, stakeholders can use Lorenz curves to understand inequality within
society, and to make policy choices among alternatives, without necessarily using the
particular welfare measure or adopting its particular ranking of outcomes.4.3. Could CAT Do Better with More Targeted Rebates?
In our stylized comparison of CAT and TPS, we have suggested that CAT can have a
higher equity penalty when we consider horizontal inequality. This stems from the
considerable variation in within-income-group electricity use and CAT’s higher effect
on the electricity price. Lurking in this result is an assumption that we cannot fix these
unequal effects after the fact, with targeted rebates that address this heterogeneity.
But could we? To what extent might we improve income-based redistribution and
move toward targeted, within-income-group rebates? We know that electricity expen-
ditures vary with household size and location, among other observed variables. How
well can we predict electricity expenditures, controlling for income?
We explore this question by taking data from the CEX and trying to predict logged
electricity expenditures. More precisely, we take all the household characteristics in the
S232 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 2019CEX interview survey, convert categorical variables to indicators, and replace missing
geographic identifiers with zeros.10 This results in a set of 133 variables. With this en-
hanced data set, we have 879 complete observations (of 1,036 original observations).
We then use the LASSO algorithm with cross-validation to choose the best predictive
model that is robust to concerns about multiple hypothesis tests (James et al. 2013).We
find 35 variables, including total expenditures, useful in predicting electricity use.11Most
of these are geographic or family composition indicators. However, all these variables to-
gether predict about half of total variation in electricity use (R-squared of 0.56), leaving
considerable residual variation.12
We present these results graphically in figure 4. As in figure 2, we use box-and-
whisker plots to show the variability within expenditure deciles, but here the horizon-
tal axis shows expenditure share rather than dollar expenditures. Dark gray boxes are
the raw data and light gray boxes are the residual variation after using these 35 var-
iables to predict electricity expenditures. Visually, considerable variation remains (in-
crementally, income alone explains 28% of the variation).
While suggestive, this is still not a complete picture. The government will have
considerably more information about individuals. For example, it may have more finely
tuned geographic identifiers.13 Such data may allow more precise targeting of rebates.
However, we suspect that considerable variation will remain in housing age, design, and
other factors, unless one is willing to turn to historical electricity use. And at some
point, an increasingly complex scheme may become impractical.
5. CONCLUSION
Our principal motivation has been to highlight that Pigouvian policies in the energy
sector may have large and often overlooked distributional consequences. In particular,
they tend to raise energy prices and lead to greater variation in household-level effects10. This includes all variables listed as “Consumer Unit (CU) Characteristics” in the data
dictionary. For many observations, geographic identifiers are omitted to protect confidentiality
in the publicly available data sets. For our purposes, available identifiers (e.g., 0/1 variables for
particular states or PSUs) can be useful predictors, and missing values simply become a refer-
ence group where we do not know the location.
11. This includes 19 geographic identifiers (two regional indicators, nine state indicators, and
eight PSU indicators), six income variables (log expenditures, two rank variables, INC_RANKand
ERANKHM, and three income category indicators), four family size and age variables (family size,
one indicator for all children >17 years, two family type indicators), and six variables describing the
housing location (two population size indicators, a rural-urban indicator, and two indicators of
housing tenure).
12. Total expenditures alone predict 28%. These other 35 variables roughly double the pre-
dictive power.
13. We observe state or primary sampling unit for 88% of our sample. Nonetheless, many
states (e.g., California) have a wide range of climate zones.
Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation Fischer and Pizer S233within income groups. These consequences are difficult to remedy through typical re-
distribution schemes. Other policies to reduce pollution can have smaller effects on
energy prices, and hence smaller distributional consequences, even as they have higher
aggregate costs to society.
Should this variation in household costs within income groups matter? Traditional
welfare notions tend to focus on overall costs to society. Distributional effects matter
to the extent that they change the underlying income distribution and make it more or
less equitable. That is, transfers from rich to poor are welfare improving given any level
of overall costs. In this paper, we have highlighted the notion of fair burden as an al-
ternative to traditional welfare notions. Fair burden emphasizes how the cost of a pub-
lic good should be shared across households, treating those with similar income (and
other characteristics) similarly, without an implicit welfare reward for redistribution
from rich to poor. Generally, we would expect a regulation to entail a nonnegative bur-
den for all households. As fair burden focuses on income changes, the approach does
place special emphasis on the preregulation distribution of income as the primary basis
for assigning burden. We have shown how to operationalize this approach by positing
welfaremeasures based on Slesnick (1989) and prospect theory (Kahneman andTverskyFigure 4. Box-and-whisker plots of electricity share by decile, highlighting the predictability
of electricity expenditures using household income and other covariates (dark gray is actual data;
light gray uses machine-learning algorithm to choose covariate controls). Note: Boxes indicate
interquartile range (IQR, 25th to 75th percentile). Vertical lines in the middle of the boxes in-
dicate median. Horizontal lines, or whiskers, show the range of values outside the IQR, up to
1.5× the IQR. Dots indicate each individual value beyond the whiskers. For normally distrib-
uted data, such dots should have a frequency of ∼1%.
S234 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists March 20191979). Both theories lead to a penalty based on how household income changes deviate
from fair burden or another reference point, incorporating both horizontal and vertical
equity.
We made these ideas concrete through the stylized comparison of two policy op-
tions that have been proposed to address carbon dioxide emissions in the electricity
sector—cap and trade with equal per household rebates (CAT) and tradable perfor-
mance standards (TPS). CAT indeed leads to much wider variation in income changes
across all income groups. Applying our welfare measure, we found that the associated
CAT equity penalty is several times that of the TPS and potentially larger than effi-
ciency advantages (about which we only speculate). A lingering question is whether
more targeted rebates under CAT could ameliorate the otherwise large variation in
income changes that underlies the penalty. Based on available data, the answer appears
to be no.
Our welfare measure does not tell us how much to weight the equity penalty versus
concerns about efficiency: that is a question of ethical and societal preferences. Such
measures can also appear to be a “black box” to stakeholders, making them unappeal-
ing. For these reasons, we also emphasize practical and intuitive ways to present the
relevant data that drive our welfare measures, including tables and figures describing
the distribution of outcomes by income decile. This approach is analogous to the use
of Lorenz curves to describe the income inequality associated with traditional welfare
notions. By making the relevant outcomes easy to understand, stakeholders can draw
their own conclusions directly, largely consistent with our welfare measures.
Given the oft-apparent disconnect between economists’ promoting Pigouvian pol-
icies and policy makers’ choosing non-Pigouvian alternatives, this paper raises an inter-
esting possibility. Perhaps horizontal equity and distributional effects are something
that policy makers have recognized for some time and that only economic analysis has
tended to overlook.APPENDIX
SIMPLIFYING SLESNICK TO PRODUCE OUR WELFARE MEASURES
With our choice of ai to be Negishi weights, the result that Du 5 u
0Dy, and the local
approximation Dui 5 u0iDyi, we can rewrite equation (3) as
Ws 5 u
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–1u0Dy, for r 5 0 we then have
Ws 5 u
0 Dy – gN–1o
i
Dyi – rij j
 
5 u0W0:
Further, assuming u(y0i ) 5 ln(y
0
i ) and ri 5 (u
0
i)
–1u0Dy 5 (y0i /y)Dy, for r 5 1 we
then have
Ws 5 u


















sign Dyi – rið Þ:
This will be nonnegative so long as g ≤ 1.
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